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Recent Decisions
DOMESTiC RELATIONS-ALIENATION OF
AFFECTIONs-INIhoR CHDREN
Two minor children, by their father and next friend, brought an
action for the alleged wrongful inducement of plaintiff's mother
to desert them and the family home. The case was heard on the
basis of diversity of citizenship. Trial was had on a motion to dismiss
on the ground, chiefly, that the alleged cause of action was not
recognized in Michigan either at common law or by statute. and
that the so-called "heart balm" statute had abolished such. civil
actions in Michigan. Held, that the plaintiffs had a common law
action for damages for invasion of their legal rights to maintenance
of the family relationship and the care and support of their mother,
and that the action was not barred by the statute. Russick v. Hicks,
85 F. Supp. 281 (W.D. Mich. 1949).
The pertinent part of the Michigan statute under consideration
follows:
"Sec. 1. All civil causes of action for alienation of affections,
criminal conversation, and seduction of any person of the age of
18 years rr more, and all causes of action for breach of contract to
marry are hereby abolished." CorMa. LAWS MrcH. 1948, § 551.301.
The district court held that, although the above statute
abolished the named causes of action with respect to husband and
wife, it did not affect the rights of minor children of alienated
spouses, the reasoning being that since the courts of Michigan had
not yet declared such a right, the statute could not abolish it. Hold-
ing iurther that the novelty of such an action was not of itself
grounds for failure to allow recovery, the district court concluded
that the right of action for alienation of affections should now by
judicial decisions be extended to children of alienated parents.
In reaching its conclusion the court followed the case of Daily
v. Parker, 152 F. 2d 174 (7th Cir. 1945). In that case, one of first
impression and the leading case permitting a child to recover
damages for the alienation of a parent's affections, the United
States Circuit Court of Appeals was interpreting the Illinois com-
mon law. The district court, in the Daily case, had denied recovery,
dismissing the complaint for failure to state a cause of action.
In reversing the trial court's decision, the circuit court held that
modern changes in the status of children in the family made it
appropriate and just to extend to them an action for alienation
of a parent's affections just as the emancipation of women led
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to the extension to them of a right to damages for loss of consortium
formerly held only by the husband.
The reasoning of the Daily case may be tenable in a state
where the common law actions for interference by a third person
with domestic relations have not been abolished by statute. Even
in such states, though the power of the courts to extend the right
of action be undenied, there is a question of whether as a matter
of policy, such an extension is desirable. Most states, where the
issue has arisen, in construing the common law, have denied re-
covery to the children in alienation cases.
The leading case contra to the Daily case is Morrow v. Yannan-
tuono, 152 Misc. 134, 273 N.Y. Supp. 912 (1934). This case, constru-
ing the common law of New York, denied recovery and based its
decision chiefly on prevention of a multiplicity of suits. The decision
has been followed in McMillen v. Taylor, 160 F. 2d 221 (D.C. Cir.
1946); Taylor v. Deefe, 134 Conn. 156, 56 A. 2d 768 (1947); and
Garza v. Garza, 209 S.W.2d 1012 (Tex.Civ. App. 1948).Each of these
decisions was based on common law tort liability. On the other
hand, there have been two state court decisions following the Daily
case and allowing children to recover under like circumstances.
Johnson v. Luhman, 330 Ill. App. 598, 71 N.E. 2d 810 (1947); Miller
v. Monsen, 37 N.W. 2d 543 (Minn. 1949).
In the one state court decision to date on the effect of a "heart
balm" statute on the right to such an action, the California Supreme
Court denied recovery to the infant children. Rudley v. Tobias,
84 Cal. App. 2d 454, 190 P. 2d 984 (1948). Drawing an analogy be-
tween an action by the children and one by the aggrieved spouse,
the court held that the statute abolishes both rights of action.
It may thus be seen, that even under decisions based on the
common law, a majority favors denial of a right of action to children
under the theory of alienation of affections. And more pertinently,
the only prior adjudication under a statute like the Michigan
law in question here, denied such right of action The weight
of numbers would therefore seem to be against the decision of the
instant case.
A consideration of the trend of legislation and commentaries by
authorities in the field indicates that the weight of reason is also
contra to the instant case. Here, the district court had the responsi-
bility of deciding Michigan law in the absence of a Michigan de-
cision on the subject. It may well be doubted that the Michigan
Supreme Court would have reached the same conclusion and have
allowed recovery.
The purpose of the "heart balm" statute in those states where it
has been adopted has been to abolish actions for alienation of affec-
tions, criminal conversation, seduction, and breach of contract to
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marry. It was felt that the allowance of such rights of action had
been proven by practical experience to be contrary to the best
interests of marriage and society generally. Therefore, though not
specifically designating children of estranged spouses, the legislative
intent should logically be held to have included all those who had
or might have had the right to such actions under the common law.
To allow children to recover in such cases would completely defeat
the purpose of the acts and in fact open the door to greater multiplic-
ity of suits, duplicity, and abuse than existed under prior decisions
permitting such actions by the injured spouse. In fact, it is almost
invariably the spouse who, before the enactment of "heart balm"
statutes, would have brought an action in his or her own right,
that would now bring an action as "next friend" of the minor
children. Because such spouse would benefit, indirectly at least,
by recovery by the children, the effect of the statute would be
largely nullified. The increase in recognition and rights of children
in the family circle is in many respects a forward step; but to
hold that such change in status should now give a right to children
which is being abolished with respect to adults, is an undue
extension, particularly in those states which, like New York,
California, and Michigan, have declared a legislative intent to
restrict such rights of action in the interest of a sound public policy.
The purpose and desired effect of "heart balm" statutes is per-
haps nowhere better stated than in the preamble to the New York
version of the act which is as follows:
"The remedies heretofore provided by law for the en-
forcement of actions based upon alleged alienation of affections,
criminal conversation, seduction, and breach of promise to marry,
having been subjected to grave abuses, causing extreme annoyance,
embarrassment, humiliation and pecuniary damage to many persons
wholly innocent and free from any wrongdoing, who were merely
the victims of circumstances, and such remedies having been ex-
ercised by unscrupulous persons for their unjust enrichment, and
such remedies having furnished vehicles for the commission or
attempted commission of crime and in many cases having resulted
in the perpetration of frauds, it is hereby declared as the public
policy of the state that the best interests of the people of the
state will be served by the abolition of such remedies." N. Y. Civ.
PRACT. ACT, §61-a.
This is the legislative intent which may well be read into the
Michigan statute involved in the instant case. In view of the spirit
expressed in the above preamble and the obvious intent of the
"heart balm" statutes which have been enacted in the wake of the
New York statute, the result in the principal case should be ques-
tioned. There may well be a reversal, therefore, either on appeal
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in the instanb case, or by legislative clarification of the Michigan
statute, or by a subsequent decision of the highest Michigan
court in a case which is certain to arise if this decision stands.
Samuel McMorris
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS - RATIFICATION OF
A FORGERY By MAKER
Plaintiffs purchased furniture from The Lake Music Company
on an installment plan. Two weeks later the plaintiffs received
notice from the defendant, a finance company, that the account had
been assigned to it and that all payments should be made to the de-
fendant. Plaintiffs made several payments to the defendant there-
after. About March 8, 1948, one of the plaintiffs became involved
in an argument with the manager of the defendant, who waved
a paper before the plaintiff and inquired whether the signature on
the paper was the plaintiff's signature. Plaintiff replied that it was
not and asked to see the paper again, but the defendant refused.
On March 10, 1948, plaintiffs paid their account in full, and were
given a negotiable note marked paid, which allegedly had been
executed by the plaintiffs. The note was signed with the names
of the plaintiffs and had been endorsed by The Lake Music Com-
pany. The plaintiffs brought an action to recover the amount paid
the defendant on the ground that the defendant had wrongfully
collected payment on a forged note. Held, that the plaintiffs could
not recover. Johnson v. Crown Finance Corp., 222 S.W. 2d 525
(Mo. 1949).
The court decided the case on two bases. First, it decided that
even if the note was a forgery the plaintiffs could not recover
because they had ratified the forgery. Secondly, it held that since
the defendant was the assignee of the debt admittedly owed by
the plaintiffs, they could not recover the money paid regardless of
the infirmity of the note since the payment discharged a debt owed
by the plaintiffs.
Ratification is the subsequent adoption and affirmance by one
person of an act which another, without authority, has previously
assumed to do for him while purporting to act as his agent. 1
MEcI-vm, TIE LAW OF AGENcY 260 (2nd. Ed).
One condition precedent to the operation of this doctrine
is that the avowed agent must not only have intended to act for
the avowed principal, but also, by the weight of authority, he must
have professed to act for the ratifying principal. Jones v. Bank of
America Nat. Trust and Savings Association, 49 Cal. App. 2d 122,
121 P. 2d 94 (1942); Hartz v. Helsendegen, 182 Mich. 129, 148
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N.W. 433 (1914); Allred v. Bray, 41 Mo. 484 (1867); Herb and Son
v. Bank of Buffalo, 66 Mo. App. 643 (1896); Brown Realty Co. v.
Myers, 89 N.J.L. 247, 98 Atl. 310 (1915); Johnson v. Insurance Co.,
66 Ohio St. 6, 63 N.E. 610 (1902); Edwards v. Heralds, 263 Pa. 548,
107 Atl. 324 (1919).
This condition is lacking in the case at bar and in all of the
forgery cases. In such cases the forger does not purport to be acting
for a principal. His success depends on convincing others that
this is the acb of another, not that he is acting for another person.
Thus the court erroneously applied the common law of ratification.
There is also a statutory reason why the court's holding as to
ratification was erroneous. Section 23 of the N.I.L. provides:
"When a signature is forged ... it is wholly inoperative, and no
right to retain the instrument, or to give a discharge therefore, or to
enforce payment thereof against any party thereto, can be acquired
through or under such signature, unless the party, against whom it
is sought to enforce such right, is precluded from setting up the
forgery." A majority of the courts, including Missouri, have held
that "precluded" as used in Section 23 is synonymous with "estop."
And thus a forgery of a negotiable instrument cannot be ratified
under the N.I.L. Embry v. Long et at, 256 Ky. 266, 75 S.W. 2d 1036
(1934); Home Credit Co. v. Fouch, 155 Md. 384, 142 Atl. 515 (1928);
Scott v. First Nat. Bank, 343 Mo. 77, 119 S.W. 2d 929 (1938); State
Planters' Bank and Trust Co. v. Fifth-Third Union Trust Co., 56
Ohio App. 309, 10 N.E. 2d 935 (1937); First Nat. Bank v. Albright,
111 Pa. Super. 392, 170 Atl. 370 (1934).
Setting aside the second basis of the decision which does not
involve negotiable instrument law, if the court desired to solve the
problem by the use of the N.I.L., it could have done so. In doing
so it could have helped clarify the interpretation of the N.I.L. in
regards to a situation which rarely occurs, that is, one in which a
"maker" pays a note and then tries to recover on the ground that
the note was a forgery.
The well known rule of Price v. Neal holds that a drawee of
a bill or check who pays an instrument which bears the forged
signature of the drawer is denied the right to recover the money so
paid to a bona fide transferee of the bill or check. And likewise
the acceptor of a forged bill is liable thereon to a bona fide purchaser
thereof. Price v. Neal, 3 Burr. 1354 (1762). There is a dearth of
authority on whether the doctrine of Price v. Neal should apply
where a maker pays a forged note to a bona fide holder. To this re-
porter's knowledge there are but two reported American cases on
the point, one holding each way. Welch v. Goodwin, 123 Mass. 71
(1877); Johnson v. Commercial Bank, 27 W. Va. 343 (1885). By
logic and reason the rule should certainly apply. It would be a
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reductio ad absurdum to hold that a drawee cannot recover because
he is bound to know the drawer's signature, or because as a matter
of policy it is felt that payment is the cutting off time; and, at the
same time, to hold that a maker need not know his own signature
or that as to him payment is not the cutting off time.
Section 62 of the N.I.L. reads: "The acceptor by accepting the
instrument engages that he will pay it according to the tenor of his
acceptance; and admits: (1) The existence of the drawer, genuine-
ness of his signature, and his capacity and authority to draw the
instrument." This clearly means that the acceptor of a forged note
must pay it and that one part of the Price v. Neal rule has been
adopted. However, there is nothing in Section 62 or any other
section of the N.I.L. specifically enacting the other part of the rule,
that is, that the drawee who has paid the forged note cannot recover
the money in an action for money had and received. Nevertheless
the great majority of the courts have held that this part of the
doctrine has been adopted by Section 62. Most of the courts merely
assume that it has been so adopted without discussing the prob-
lem at all. Nat. Bank of Commerce v. Mechanics' American Nat.
Bank, 148Mo.App.1,127S.W.429 (1910);United States Fidelity and
Guaranty Co. v. First Nat. Bank of Omaha, 129 Neb. 102, 260 N.W.
798 (1935); Peoples Trust and Guaranty Co. of Hackensack v.
Genden and Guaranty Trust Co. of N. Y., 119 N.J. Eq. 249, 182 Atl.
25 (1936); The First Nat. Bank of Canton v. Karas, 14 Ohio App. 147
(1920); First Nat. Bank of Cottage Grove v. Bank of Cottage Grove,
59 Ore. 388, 117 Pac. 293 (1911). Others, because of the anomaly it
would create to say that the acceptor is bound to pay the forged note
and at the same time to say that a drawee who pays a forged check
could recover the money so paid, have expanded the literal mean-
ing of the language to cover the payment aspect of the problem. Nat.
Bank of Rolla v. First Nat. Bank of Salem, 141 Mo. App. 719, 125
S.W. 513 (1910); First Nat. Bank of Portland v. United States Nat.
Bank of Portland, 100 Ore. 264, 197 Pac. 547 (1921); Fidelity and
Casualty Co. of N. Y. v. Planenscheck, 200 Wis. 304, 277 N.W. 387
(1929). Still other courts hold that the N.IL. does not deal with
the payment situation because it does not involve the liability of a
party to a negotiable instrument and is not a problem
concerning negotiable instrument law. They hold that it is a problem
concerning an affirmative right against a former holder of a
negotiable instrument which has been discharged by payment and
that the problem should be determined by quasi-contract law.
Therefore the rule of Price v. Neal is applied through Section 196
which states: "In any case not provided for in this act the rules
of the law merchant shall govern." Bank of Pulaski v. Bloomfleld
State Bank, 226 N.W. 119 (1929), superseded by 210 Iowa 817, 232
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N.W. 124 (1930); South Boston Trust Co. v. A. P. Levin, 249 Mass.
45, 143 N.E. 816 (1924).
While it would be most difficult to expand the language of
Section 62 to cover the maker situation since Section 62 reads in
terms of acceptors and relates to bills of exchange, the court, in the
case at bar, could easily have held that the problem is not one con-
cerning negotiable instrument law which the N.I.L. attempted
to cover, but rather that it concerns the existence or non-existence
of a right against a former transferee of a note which has been
discharged. And under Section 196 the law merchant is to govern.
To summarize, the court's decision on the second basis was
sound for the debt paid was owed to the defendant, the assignee
of the debt. But in regards to the alternative basis of ratification,
the holding seems erroneous for there was no avowal which is neces-
sary for ratification at common law; and the Missouri Supreme
Court, along with the majority of the courts, has held that under
Section 23 of the N.I.L. there can be no ratification of a forged
negotiable instrument.
If the court desired to have an alternative basis for its decision,
and to help clear up and make certain the interpretation of the
N.I.L. it could easily have done so by holding that the problem was
one concerning quasi-contracts and that under Section 196 of the
N.I.L. the law merchant governs the case. Robert J. Leaver
TRUSTS - PRIVATE CHARITABLE CORPORATIONS - TORT LIABILITY
Plaintiff, a member of defendant church, sued to recover
damages for injuries sustained in a fall on ice which had formed
on the public sidewalk as a result of the alleged negligent construc-
tion and maintenance of the premises by the defendant church. The
trial court overruled plaintiff's demurrer to the first count of the
defendant's answer which claimed immunity from liability on the
ground that defendant was a private corporation organized solely
for charitable and religious purposes. Held, reversed and remanded.
The defendant was entitled to no immunity for negligent acts
merely because it was a private charitable corporation. Foster v.
Roman Catholic Diocese of Vermont, 70 A. 2d 230 (Vt. 1950).
Thus Vermont, in its first decision on the question, lent its
weight to the modern rule imposing full liability on charitable
corporations for injuries resulting from their negligence. Volumin-
ous are the decisions and opinions dealing with this problem. Conflict
in decision and reason runs rampant. From full immunity one may
follow a legal maze to complete responsibility. Such judicial un-
certainty indicated to Rutledge, J. in Georgetown College v. Hughes,
130 F. 2d 810 (D.C. Cir. 1942) "something wrong at the beginning
or that something has become wrong since then."
1950]
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Briefly, there are three classifications of the state decisions; the
non-liability cases which deny any liability whatever, the total
liability cases which hold the charity to the regular rules of negli-
gence, and the partial liability cases which grant liability for certain
classes of plaintiffs or for certain acts of negligence. Numerically,
the latter class represents the weight of authority with the non-lia-
bility cases and the total liability cases following in that order.
There is a noticeable trend towards full liability. The non-
liability rule has become pockmarked with exceptions. In those
jurisdictions which grant partial liability a charitable corpora-
tion may be liable to a stranger, that is, one not a recipient of
any benefits from the institution. Cohen v. General Hospital Society
of Connecticut, 113 Conn. 188, 154 Atl. 435 (1931). Liability may
also be found where the injured party is an employee of the charity.
Cowan v. North Carolina Baptist Hospital, Inc., 197 N.C. 41, 147
S.E. 672 (1929). If the beneficiary is a paying patient a few states
allow a recovery for negligent injury. Tucker v. Mobile Infirmary
Ass'n. 191 Ala. 572, 68 So. 4 (1915). In some cases liability hinges on
the nature of the negligent act. Thus while negligent operation of
an ambulance affords grounds for recovery, Daniels V. Rahway
Hospital, 10 N.J. Misc. 585, 160 Atl. 644 (1932); Carelessly pushing
a cart in the corridors of a hospital does not. Boeckel v. Orange
Memorial Hospital, 108 N.J.L. 453, 158 Atl. 832 (1932). If the charity
is covered by liability insurance, liability may be imposed. O'Connor
v. Boulder Colorado Sanitarium Ass'n., 105 Colo. 259, 96 P. 2d 835
(1939). In other states this fact has no effect. Mississippi Baptist
Hospital v. Moore, 156 Miss. 676, 126 So. 465 (1930). Liability may
be found to the extent of property owned for income, not charitable,
purposes. Morton v. Savannah Hospital, 148 Ga. 438, 96 S.E. 887
(1918). Exception is the rule. The weight of authority apparently
allowing all but the beneficiary to recover for negligent injury.
While dissension rages in the courts' decisions it is remarkable
that the legal scholars stand so unanimous. PRossm ox ToRTs 1079
(1941), HAmPER ON TORTS § 294 (1933), BOGERT, TRUSTS AND
TRUSTEES §§ 731-35 (1935), SCOTT ON TRUSTS § 402 (1939), Feezer,
The Tort Liability of Charities, 77 U. PA. L. REv. 191 (1928). All
agree that the charitable corporation should be held accountable
for its negligence on a par with all other persons and private cor-
porations.
No more than a cursory examination of the various theories
advanced as a basis for non-liability will be attempted here.
Principally, there are three: the trust fund theory; the theory that
the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply to charitable
trusts; and the theory of implied waiver. All of these theories have
been vigorously attacked. Zollman, Damage Liability of Charitable
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Institutions, 19 MiCH. L. REv. 395 (1921); Feezer, supra.
The trust fund theory, perhaps the most widely followed yet
most susceptible to attack, owes its origin to the dictum of Lord
Cottenham in the Feoffees of Heriot's Hospital v. Ross, 12 Clark and
Fin. 507, 8 Eng. Rep. 1508 (1846). This theory is founded upon the
reasoning that the fund donated creates a trust fund to be used for
a particular charitable purpose and that a payment of tort claims
would be a deviation from the intended purpose of the donor. This
doctrine was shortlived in England. It was expressly repudiated in
Mersey Docks v. Gibbs, 11 H.L. Cas. 443, 11 Eng. Rep. 1405 (1866).
Today both England and Canada hold a charity to the universal
standard of care. Hillyer v. St. Bartholomew Hospital, 2 K.B. 820
(1909); Donaldson v. General Public Hospital, 35 Ont. L. R. 98, 26
D.L.R. 346 (1915).
Ten years after the English repudiation of the doctrine it was
reborn in America in McDonald v. Masschusetts General Hospital,
120 Mass. 432 (1876), the court apparently unaware of the English
reversal Since the Massachusetts case the rule has found its way in-
to the decisions of a great many courts.Basically, the rule is unsound.
It must stand, if at all, unqualified, for the deviation from the trust
purpose is as great in a payment of damages to a stranger or em-
ployee, who may recover, as payment would be to a beneficiary who
can not.
Non-liability may also be founded on the doctrine that the
rule of respondeat superior does not apply to charitable institutions.
Ohio apparently follows this view. Taylor v. The Protestant Hospi-
tal Ass'n., 85 Ohio St. 90, 96 N.E. 1089 (1911). This view may be
criticized in that it, too, is all inclusive. If it is to be followed then
the charity should be no more liable for the negligence of its officers
and managers than it is for the negligence of its employees.
Similarly, status of the claimant, whether stranger, employee, or
beneficiary, would not affect the charity's immunity. The partial
liability cases have seemingly exceptioned this rule to absurdity.
Another basis for non-liability is the implied-waiver theory
based upon an implied contract that the beneficiary of the charity
waives the right to sue for negligent injury. It is pure fiction,
and having been severely criticized as such, has been for the most
part completely discarded by the courts.
In principle it may be said that all of the offered theories are
grounded in public policy, that society's interest in the charity re-
quires that the rights of the injured individual should be subordi-
nated for the public good. However sound this argument may have
been in the past, under modern conditions it appears tenuous.
Charitable corporations still flourish in the jurisdictions which have
imposed full tort liability. Today's charity has acquired size along
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with business methods. Liability insurance at low cost has appeared
on the scene. Every charitable dollar does not go to the mark.
Salaries, overhead, and current expenses are accepted as legitimate
deviations. Why not liability insurance?
The individual has always been held accountable for negligent
injury regardless of his charitable intent. Does public policy
find something sacred in negligence committed by the corporate
form? Though the trend is shifting towards full liability, in most
jurisdictions today the beneficiary is still denied recovery. Ironically,
he is the very person the donor to the charity intended to aid. When
benevolence has injured the beneficiary, does public policy favor
denying him remedy? The contrary appears shockingly evident.
Society would seem better served by imposing full liability where
good intentions have done wrong.
It is settled, Ohio is a partial liability jurisdiction. The char-
ity is liable to third parties but not to a beneficiary unless the
authorities of the institution failed to exercise due care in se-
lection or retention of its employees. Taylor Adm. v. The Pro-
testant Hospital Association, 85 Ohio St. 90, 96 N.E. 1089 (1911);
Taylor v. Flower Deaconess Home and Hospital, 104 Ohio St. 61,
135 N.E. 287 (1922); Duvelius v. Sisters of Charity of Cincinnati,
37 Ohio App. 17, 174 N.E. 256 (1930); The City Hospital of Akron v.
Lewis, 47 Ohio App. 465, 192 N.E. 140 (1934); Cullen v. Schnit, 139
Ohio St. 194, 39 N.E. 2d 146 (1942); Newman v. Cleveland Museum,
143 Ohio St. 369, 55 N.E. 2d 575 (1944).
It is commendable that the Ohio court has gone so far towards
total abolition of the non-liability rule; it is regretted that the court
still refuses to take the last step by allowing the beneficiary, too,
the right to recover. This is law founded on precedent, not reason.
If the court feels committed, the legislature should act. It is desired
that the law be settled, it is fundamental that the law be just.
Jay M. Terbush
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION - APPLICATiON OF
EJUSDEim GENERIS
By a five to three decision, Justice Douglas not sitting, the
United States Supreme Court held that phonograph records were
included within the proscribed matter of 18 U.S.C. § 1462. The
pertinent provisions of the act are as follows: "Whoever**- know-
ingly deposits with any express company or other common carrier,
for carriage in interstate *** commerce any obscene, lewd, lasci-
vious, or filthy book, pamphlet, picture, motion-picture film, paper,
letter, writing, print, or other matter of indecent character * * *
Shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than
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five years, or both." United States v. Alpers, 70 S. Ct. 352 (1949).
Since phonograph records were not mentioned in the statute,
the court was faced with the problem of whether or not they were
intended to be included within the general words, "or other matter
of indecent character." If the interpretation is confined to the items
specified, the general words would be rendered meaningless, but
on the other hand, to give the general words their fullest meaning
would make the enumeration meaningless. To avoid the horns of
this dilemma courts often apply the rule of construction known as
ejusdem generis. 2 SuTrm Ain, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 398 (3rd
ed. 1943). This rule says that the general words include only those
things which are of the same class as those specifically enumerated.
In reversing the court of appeals the majority refused to apply
the rule, saying that to do so as the court of appeals had done
would defeat the obvious intent of the statute, which the majority
declared to be the passage in interstate commerce of obscene ideas
no matter how communicated.
The dissenters were not convinced that phonograph records
were within the obvious intent of Congress as expressed by the
words of the statute. They also dissented upon the basis that such
a construction, especially of a criminal statute, made it difficult to
know in advance of court determination just what acts would
constitute an offense within the meaning of the words used in a
statute. They thought that the court of appeals had committed no
error in employing the rule of ejusdem generis and that since the
specific enumeration was confined to those things which would
convey obscene ideas by visible means, the general words were
also confined to the matter which conveyed obscene ideas through
the sense of sight.
. The divergence between the majority and the minority seems
to center around the problem of how the intent of Congress is to
be ascertained, The majority apparently took intent to mean the
object of the legislation, that is, just what problem was Congress
dealing with when it enacted the legislation. In this case the
object was the prohibition from interstate commerce of anything
which conveyed obscene ideas. The minority contended that the in-
tent should be drawn only from the words of the statute.
In the cases decided before 1900 the court adhered rather
closely to the notion that the intent should only be drawn from the
words used. United States v. Lawrence, 13 Blatchf. 211, Fed. Case
No. 15,572 (1875); United States v. Chase, 135 U.S. 255 (1890);
United States v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. 76 (U.S. 1820). While in
the more recent cases, those decided since 1900, the court has not
consistently followed either mode of construction.
These more recent cases indicate that if the defendant's act
1950]
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falls wiiiin the object of the legislation he will not escape conviction
under a narrow application of ejusdem generis. There are several
ways in which its application may be avoided. The enumeration
may be said to exhaust the class so that the general words refer
to another class. United States v. Mesca l, 215 U.S. 26 (1909). It
will not be applied when to do so would make the general words
meaningless. Mason v. United States, 260 U.S. 545 (1923). Then
it might be avoided as it was in the principal case upon the view
that to apply it would defeat the obvious intent of the legislation.
United States v. Raynor, 302 U. S. 540 (1938).
On the other hand, the fact that the defendant's act was not
one of those falling within the object of the statute will not prevent
his conviction if his acts can fairly be said to fall within the words
of the statute. Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14 (1946); Gooch
v. United States, 297 U.S. 124 (1936); Caminetti v. United States,
242 U.S. 470 (1917).
If the above analysis is valid, this case can fairly be said to fall
within the general tenor of the more recent cases. Any dispute
over its validity would probably resolve itself as it was in the dis-
sent and in the majority opinion over whether the intent of Congress
should be drawn solely from the words of the statute or whether
the intent should be drawn from the object of the legislation.
Jesse Jennings
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